MAKING THE FAMILIAR STRANGE:  
A DELEUZIAN PERSPECTIVE ON CREATIVITY

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Abstract

Create/Innovate or die. This is the taken-for-granted ‘truth’ in the social, political and economic context in which we currently live. In fact, so accepted is this mantra that criticism seems foolish, mere evidence of the entrenched conservatism that needs to be challenged. In this essay we posit an alternative view of creativity, drawing in particular on the thinking of Gilles Deleuze. In doing so we hope to challenge clichéd representations of ‘creativity’ and assist scholars to become more creative (or at least more reflective) in their own practice.
Making the Familiar Strange: 
A Deleuzian Perspective on Creativity

Introduction
The purpose of our essay is, to borrow a phrase, ‘to make the familiar seem strange’. In particular we want to problematise the moral crusade that seems to be waged on account of the construct ‘creativity and innovation’, a crusade that has remained largely unchallenged. From such a ‘strange’ perspective typical statements that “many companies shy away from novel solutions” (Kelley, 2001: 13), that creativity and innovation are very much lacking (or are at the very least a scarce and precious commodity) in modern society, will be considered as particular ideological readings, rather than expressions of fact. We aim to expose a range of clichés and ready-made representations we find in the literature on creativity and innovation management, and force scholars in the field to engage in a deeper exploration of the implications of the ‘creative process’. In proceeding thus, we rely on a force-fit a connection between the field of creativity and innovation and certain writings in philosophy and social theory, in particular those of French process philosopher Gilles Deleuze. Given the emphasis on ‘process’ and ‘flow’ in recent years (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Drazin et al., 1999; Mauzy & Harriman, 2003) it seems somewhat surprising that creativity studies have largely ignored a body of work which has continued to expand in importance and impact in recent years, not least in the field of management and organization theory. This absence is all the more puzzling since the notion of creativity, and indeed that of “creative organization” (Hardt, 1993: 20), plays such a central role in the Deleuzian oeuvre.

What is Creativity? (A Deleuzian perspective)

“Philosophy is not communicative, any more than it is contemplative and reflective: it is creative or even revolutionary, by nature, in that it is ceaselessly creating new concepts. The only condition is that these should have a necessity, as well as a strangeness, and they have both to the extent they respond to real problems. Concepts are what stops thought being mere opinion, a view, an exchange of views, gossip” (Deleuze, 1995: 136).
Deleuze explores creativity as an intellectual activity, with particular reference to philosophy (although also the arts and to a lesser degree the sciences) and the creation of concepts. Deleuze argues that philosophers should not reflect on things; that mere representation alone imposes rules on our thinking and is inherently limiting (Deleuze, 1994:135). Instead Deleuze believes that what (good) philosophers actually do is create, by generating new concepts: “To think is to create – there is no other creation – but to create is first of all to engender ‘thinking’ in thought” (Deleuze, 1994: 147). His concern is to open us up to new powers of thinking, and its power of becoming. This creative thinking is a freedom, although a freedom not entirely our own, for thinking is transformed by what is outside us and by chance events. Deleuze looks to a form of thinking that strives for “production, mutation and creation…we do philosophy to expand thought to its infinite potential” (Colebrook, 2002: 15).

This process of becoming, the creation of what is not yet, is achieved through extending the virtual; thinking in new, perhaps previously unimagined, modes of thinking. For Deleuze, the concept of difference – thinking differently, becoming different, and the creation of difference – is key to maximising the potential of life. The concept enables us to move beyond that which we know and experience and think how this might be extended. It provokes us, dislodges us from our ways of thinking. It creates whole new lines of thinking; new possibilities. This is thinking that reforms itself over and over again, eternally; thinking that is not defined by an image it creates of itself (Colebrook, 2002).

“Thinking is always experiencing, experimenting, not interpreting but experimenting, and what we experience, experiment with, is always actuality, what’s coming into being, what’s new, what’s taking shape” (Deleuze, 1995:106).

Deleuze argues that what is typically ignored is the power of the ‘virtual’ in favour of a focus on the actual world. The virtual is a potentiality of becoming, a power to become. But the actual world is limited in its future possibilities by what is already given. The actual world, therefore, evolves through the unfolding of given possibilities towards a
given end. In the virtual world, however, there is the power to become in unforeseen ways, unlimited by the actual world. The virtual is real, though not actual, but virtualities may become actualised in the present. Deleuze advocated ‘actualization’ over ‘realization’. The process of realization is guided by resemblance and limitation. The real is thought to be in the image of the possible it realizes; the possible simply has reality added to it, but there is no difference. Furthermore since not all possibilities can be realised, there is also a process of limitation. However for the virtual to become actual it must create its own terms of actualisation; with no preformed order this is a process of creative evolution.

*What would be necessary for the creative organization of the actual... would be an enlarging, inclusive movement oriented toward the future capable of producing a new unity... In these terms, the organization of the actual would have to be a movement from perception to a new ‘recollection’ that would be a future memory (a sort of futur antérieur or future perfect in the grammatical sense) as a common point of real organization” (Hardt, 1993: 20-21).*

Central to the philosophy of Deleuze are the notions of ‘transcendence’ and ‘immanence’. ‘Transcendence’ is that which lies outside; it is an ‘exteriority’ upon which our thinking relies. It appears as something we can know or reveal or interpret. ‘Truth’ would be a form of transcendence: we imagine that there is some form of truth ‘out there’ awaiting discovery or interpretation. Immanence, on the other hand, is the thought that produces the ground. Deleuze refers to ‘planes of immanence’: plateaus from which further thinking occurs; the assumptions and distinctions from which we think which constitutes the ‘outside’ of thought and which creates the exterior – the world we know – which in turn creates planes of transcendence. For Deleuze, even our subjectivity is a form of transcendence. We have created an “image of thought” (Deleuze, 1994:131) which is accepted as common sense, the taken-for-granted and the foundation for opinion. For Deleuze transcendence is ultimately an illusion: it is a creation of the planes of immanence. He therefore aims to expose the ‘illusion’ of transcendence, to demonstrate that the transcendent image is merely an invention. Paradoxically, this also exhibits the power of the inventive process – that thinking can be so powerful as to
enslave itself to images of a transcendent ‘outside’ (Colebrook, 2002:71). Like Foucault (1972), Deleuze (with Guattari) explores historically situated illusions of transcendence – most notably in the context of the history of philosophy where ‘planes of transcendence’ have created grounds for thinking (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994).

Philosophy, for Deleuze, gives ‘consistency’ to chaos, and allows us to think the immanent difference that produces transcendence (Colebrook, 2002). But it is never a full return to the first level of absolute ‘deterritorialization’, before transcendence. By deterritorialization Deleuze refers to the freeing of a possibility from its origins, its original territory. In contrast, territorialization refers to the manner by which we organise (particularly language) such that it remains constrained by this territory. Remaining territorialized naturally limits future possibilities to what is already given, to the constraints of the ordering of language:

“In Deleuze’s view, language is charged with power relations. The object of language is not communication, but the inculcation of mots d’ordre-‘slogans,’ ‘watchwords,’ but also literally ‘words of order,’ the dominant, orthodox ways of classifying, organizing, and explaining the world. Far from being a mere collection of ideological signifiers, language is a mode of action, the various mots d’ordre of a culture being enforced through regular patterns of practice, ‘collective assemblages of enunciation,’ or ‘regimes of signs’” (Bogue, 2004: 71).

So philosophers have to create, and recreate concepts that give ‘consistency’ to this chaos – but in doing so they have to constantly reopen their thinking to the outside without allowing the plane of immanence (the assumptions, distinctions, ‘images’) to act as a foundation, to ‘territorialize’. Philosophy, therefore, is practical: “Thinking’s never just a theoretical matter. It has to do with vital problems. To do with life itself.” (Deleuze, 1995: 105). And the notion of immanence is key to Deleuze’s philosophy; it is the essence of philosophy.

“Thinking experience as an open and immanent whole acknowledges that each new event of experience will transform what experience is, thereby precluding in principle any final or closed ground for experience. Immanence is, then, for
Deleuze the only true philosophy. If we allow thought to accept some transcendent foundation – such as reason, God, truth or human nature – then we have stopped thinking. And if immanence is philosophy for Deleuze it is also an ethics: not allowing experience to be enslaved by any single image that would elevate itself above others.” (Smith, 2003: 79; see also Nietzsche, 1976: 451).

The question, therefore, is how to avoid this grounding of our thinking that would otherwise prevent us from thinking creatively. By way of example we can explore Deleuze’s identification of our ‘consciousness’ as enslaving. The very fact of our consciousness, Deleuze argues, is a process of fixing, of recognising an image rather than creating anew (Deleuze, 1983). In a similar fashion, the very fact of ‘thinking’ having a form means that it is already conforming with a model taken from somewhere – such as the State, the Market – but no longer seen, as such (Buchanan, 2000:75). For Deleuze this conformity to a form is close to becoming complicity: “The State gives thought a form of interiority, and thought gives that interiority a form of universality” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 375). Deleuze’s concept of ‘nomadism’ appears a logical extension of this critique; a form of thought that owes nothing to established models, nor engages with them. The nomadic thinker is one who is free to create new connections, open up experience to new becomings, in short – to think differently. As a consequence, it may appear that Deleuze suggests a nomadic existence rather than a sedentary one, but his real point is that there are always new ways of thinking, and that ‘our’ conception of philosophy isn’t the only one (Buchanan, 2000: 74). Deleuze is not driven by a desire to propose a way of thinking- one true answer (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). Deleuze & Guattari (1986) related the ‘nomad’ to ‘minor science.’ Reproductive science or ‘Royal Science’ is, for Deleuze, inherently uncreative in that the supposedly ‘creative’ processes are captured. The modes of thinking are known, often explicitly specified and expected of those working within the scientific tradition. This results in a proliferation of imitation, and a limitation to what can be created, for all the possibilities have to emerge from the limited givens and through the limited procedures possible; in essence the Royal Science knows how things are to be done, and what the possible answers can be. By articulating a minor science, Deleuze is proposing an ‘untimely’ approach to science –
that is a science acting counter to its time, by thinking outside these limits, and hopefully in a manner for the benefit of time to come.

Perhaps Deleuze’s most utopian idea is that one can think differently. It is not the point of origin of thought, nor the content of thought that matters, but that the way of thinking can be new or distinct (Buchanan, 2000). Nor does Deleuze propose a particular form of new thinking, but rather a ‘polyphonic’ (see Bakhtin, 1984) form of philosophy: an ‘assemblage’ of forms of thinking (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Deleuze enables us to see the possibility of creating a fresh way of thinking; and one that is entirely practical rather than theoretical; and one that is political (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977; see also Patton, 2000) as we shall now explore.

Creativity and Capitalism

“The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and with them the relations of production, and with them all the relations of society... Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social relations, everlasting uncertainty and agitation, distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones...” (Marx & Engels, 1972: 476).

“Innovation valued by the marketplace has long been recognized as a creator and sustainer of enterprise...But innovation can also destroy... innovations... continually undermine established products and services. Enterprises that fail to keep pace with these innovations are quickly swept from the field” (Harvard Business Essentials, 2003).

On taking a casual stroll through any airport bookshop it has almost become impossible to avoid the ‘how to become (more) creative’ type of books. One could be forgiven for getting a little confused as it appears that creativity is both ubiquitous and severely lacking in today’s institutions. The discourse of creativity is rife within society (Thrift, 2002), with the necessity for creativity (and innovation) now seemingly elevated above
many other aspects of traditional management discourse. This ‘creative imperative’ can be seen alongside developments in (primarily information) technology that enable ever-intensifying change. Contemporary business not only has to change, but change rapidly and perpetually – with today’s success very much tomorrow’s history.

Deleuze’s work is inherently interested in the capitalist system: “What interests us the most is the analysis of capitalism as an immanent system that constantly pushes back its proper limits, and that always finds them again on a larger scale, because the limit is Capital itself[11]” (quoted in a moving obituary by Derrida, 1998). The ‘untimely’ (Deleuze, 1990: 265) nature of his philosophy was in part the destruction of the precept of capitalism; the ‘territory’ of capital. We can deterritorialize, to some extent, by the imagining of other beings, but ultimately this deterritorialization is limited by the retention of the unit of capital. Newly created concepts are seen as ‘things’ to be sold or exchanged; all our imaginings of becomings are measured through capital units. For Deleuze this has both positive and negative aspects. A positive perspective can be seen by the deterritorialization possible by this system of exchange – any aspect of life can be opened up to exchange and interaction. However, this deterritorialization relies on an initial territorialization – that of capital – which creates the tendency for quantification of all exchange, even the value of concepts. Here, the becoming doesn’t fully deterritorialize; it doesn’t fully escape its original territory. Even creativity (in the form of “creative” knowledge) is increasingly valued as a commodity in this economy. Deleuze is not so much anti-capitalist, as desiring an expansion of possibilities beyond the limits of capital. Indeed rebelling against capitalism creates its own problems: by projecting an opposing set of ideas one conforms to a new form of thinking, a new territory.

Perhaps the problem with conceptions of the capitalism, and its creative imperative, can be found in the notion of ‘truth.’ The way we perceive and order the world is not a distortion of the true, for appearances have no higher truth. In much of current creativity discourse, however, there seems to be this assumption of truth – the truth that is the value of ‘creativity’, the compulsion for ‘creativity’. The desire for creation, as typified by
much of the creativity literature and management discourse, talks about ‘frame breaking’ and ‘changing the domain’ in which it works, but in reality this ‘creativity’ is no different from Deleuze’s Royal Science – it is, in a manner of speaking, a creativity captured by capitalism. Here the notion of creativity is limited to that of reproduction; working within and from the plane of immanence that grounds (and thus limits) our thinking with the territory of capital. Creativity is treated as a ‘something,’ as a value in itself (Thrift, 2000: 676). Furthermore, the processes of ‘creativity’ are thought to be understood; they are ‘captured’ and taught. In effect we are seeing an engineering of the creative process; one that is repeated for its own sake. And in this process of fixing creativity – of territorializing creativity – we are losing the very ability to be truly creative:

“Any such moral or rationalistic avowal (of creativity) runs the risk of turning the value of creativity into something like ‘fashion’, the endless repetition of permanent change under conditions of permanent imitation – production for the sake of production, ‘ideas’ for the sake of ideas – and something which ultimately, perhaps precisely because of its character as a sort of compulsory heterodoxy, has conservative effects” (Osborne, 2003: 512).

In essence we believe that we have over-romanticised the notion of ‘creativity’ in capitalist society. Creative thinking has become a ‘timely’ thinking, and therefore almost an ‘un-thinking’. It is also limited, in a very uncreative manner, to our current perceptions of what creativity is, and how we can be creative. Furthermore, creativity is valued by and captured within the territory of capital. In an effort to further ‘un-romanticise’ creativity we now turn to explore the ‘darker’ side of the creative process.

**Creativity as Destruction, Creativity as Work**

“It is extraordinary that citizens of the contemporary West could imagine hat overlooking the changeability of things is one of our greatest perils. On the contrary, there is far too much change around, not too little. Whole ways of life are wiped out almost overnight. Men and women must scramble frantically to acquire new skills or be thrown on the scrapheap” (Eagleton, 2004: 164).
A particular feature of much of the creativity literature is the focus on creativity as something ‘fun’ and ‘enjoyable’ (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1996:108). Yet, it is useful to reflect on the ‘darker’ side of the creative process; to reconnect it with terms such as ‘destruction’ and ‘loss’. This aspect of creativity is perhaps best documented at the societal or market level, such as for example in Joseph Schumpeter’s ‘gales of creative destructioniii’. Indeed, as Marshall Berman (1983: 288) elaborates, capitalism “annihilates everything that it creates – physical environments, social institutions, metaphysical ideas, artistic visions, moral values – in order to create more, to go on endlessly creating the world anew”. To put this in a Deleuzian vocabulary:

“Everywhere capitalism develops, it undermines traditional social codes-kinship systems, religious beliefs, class hierarchies, taboos, ritual trade relations and so on and releases uncoded fluxes of heterogeneous matter, ideas, affects, and fantasies. But…it constantly recodes fluxes and flows within new forms of social organization…in an effort to maintain a controlled and universal exchange of commodities” (Bogue, 2004:35).

The creative forces involved here are clearly destructive. By limiting ourselves to thinking within the territory of capital, we judge creativity as a value, indeed a necessity, for society, but we are not sufficiently reflective on the negative, or pointless aspects of this process. As capitalism is a pre-given, a transcendent system, then even if we judge the impacts of change, of creativity, to be harmful, we never question the need to change per se. It is important, therefore, to be reminded that change is in part a product of human agency; that much of the explosion of ‘creativity’ is as a direct result of the conscious efforts of individuals (Osborne, 2003). In reality, the change we experience is almost certainly a rather prosaic mixture of progress, in the positive sense of the word, and deterioration (Eagleton, 2004).

These destructive (and positive) forces are not just evident at the level of society. Deleuze, in discussing Foucault and his development of conceptions such as discourse, knowledge and power, with reference to his book *Madness and Civilisation* comments:

“There’s something great writers often go through: they’re congratulated on a book, the book’s admired, but they aren’t themselves happy with it, because they
know how far they still are from what they’re trying to do, what they’re seeking, of which they still have only an obscure idea. That’s why they’ve so little time to waste on polemics, objections, discussions. I think Foucault’s thought is a thought that didn’t evolve but went from one crisis to another. I don’t believe thinkers can avoid crises, they’re too seismic” (Deleuze, 1995:104), but goes on to add: “For Foucault it was a great period of energy and exhilaration, of creative gaiety” (1995:105). The key point here is the notion of creativity as a process of personal and perpetual crisis, of knowing that concepts aren’t ‘finished’, of knowing one hasn’t succeeded, of being thrown back into the open sea. The authentic artist, philosopher or scientist is working on the continually evolving, unfinished and ‘unfinishable’ project.

Artists provide a further useful point of exposition. By trying to be creative, in a very conscious way, rather than merely working at some idea or problem, they are by that very act being uncreative. Successive generations of young artists in Britain, usually subsumed under the heading of ‘Brit Art’, have been trying to shock the nation with new forms of art – often exemplified in the annual Turner Prize competition which seeks to showcase ‘innovative’ art. However in their conscious desire to be creative, to try and shock, they have become increasingly clichéd, even passé, and furthermore demonstrate a reliance on imitation rather than genuinely new thinking. Their aim is to isolate and reproduce an aspect of reality in order to award it an outside prize, to confer upon it a value which is not intrinsic to it but which derives from an abstract historical, social or economic schema. Their endeavours can be compared to the artist working on a new idea; trying to improve it but never quite succeeding, knowing it isn’t quite ‘there’. At the risk of another cliché, this is the ‘authentic artist’ – the artist who is focused on working to develop and improve the idea, trying to respond to the problem, but knowing this response isn’t quite good enough; not the artist who is ‘trying to be creative’.

The painter Paul Cézanne, generally considered as one of the most important innovators in the history of paintingiv (cf. Berger, 2001; Doran, 2001) provides a good exemplification of the various Deleuzian concepts explored so far. His was a very
peculiar kind of ‘creativity’, one that one eschewed novelty and instead focused on work and repetition. As he put it himself “The quest for novelty and originality is an artificial need which can never disguise banality and the absence of artistic temperament” (Dorian, 2001: 17). What to make, for example, of Cézanne’s stubbornness in wanting to paint the same view of Mont Sainte-Victoire over and over again? It is as if it were necessary for Cézanne to do justice to something that was not the idea of ‘the mountain’ but that represented the singularity (the ‘immanence’) of this mountain, here and now, this morning at this hour in this light. For Cézanne the work of painting involved repetition, “repetition in the name not just of seeking an answer to something but of locating, deepening, embellishing a problem...” (Osborne, 2003: 520). It is repetition of an attempt - and endlessly so, because the attempt never materializes into a final accomplishment. What is at stake is not closure but the opening out of further possibilities. As Berger (2001: 228) put it: “The space, the depth in Cézanne’s later paintings refuses to close: it remains open to ‘simultaneity’: it is full of the promise of reciprocity.” Through the Mont Sainte-Victoire landscape – because Cézanne used it over and over again as his raw material – one comes to see what seeing means. Rather than letting himself be held prisoner by the very materiality of the world, his paintings tell us that he is the only one to see well. It is what Paul Ricoeur (1998: 179) referred to as the enigma of creation:

“The modesty or the pride of the artist – in this case, it amounts to the same thing – is probably to know at this very moment how to make the gesture that every person should make. In apprehending the singularity of the question there is the sentiment of an incredible obligation; in the case of Cézanne or Van Gogh we know that it was overwhelming. It is as if the artist experienced the urgency of an unpaid debt with respect to something singular that had to be said in a singular manner.”

The explanation of creation thus has to be sought in the process of production itself; the power of the paintings lies in their painting. Nothing appeared more sacred to Cézanne than work: “My method is to love working” (Dorian, 2001: 127). He believed that reality could best be approached through work, precisely because reality itself was a form of production. Cézanne never wanted to let the logic of the painting take precedence over
the continuity of perception: after each brushstroke he had to re-establish his innocence as perceiver; he often talked about “forgetting everything” (ibid.: 36) when painting. Precisely because the task he set himself was never really achievable, Cézanne was always dogged by a greater or lesser sense of his own failure. What he could not realize was that in failing to paint the pictures he wanted, he heightened our awareness of the visible as it had never been heightened before. To quote John Berger again:

“There is something very poignant about Cézanne, shocked in moments of doubt by his own non-conformity, fearing that his whole art was based on a personal deformity of vision, and it later being established that no painter had ever been as faithful to the actual processes by which we all see” (Berger, 2001: 227-228).

Isn’t this precisely how Deleuze views ‘the creator’?

“A creator who isn’t grabbed around the throat by a set of impossibilities is no creator. A creator’s someone who creates their own impossibilities, and thereby creates possibilities... without a set of impossibilities, you won’t have the line of flight, the exit that is creation...” (Deleuze, 1995: 133).

Creativity… Made Strange

Osborne, in a recent paper proposing a philistine attitude to ‘creativity’, made reference to Deleuze (amongst others) as an exemplar of his argument. Whilst we agreed with the overall message – that we need to liberate ourselves “from the potentially moronic consequences of the doctrine of creativity” (Osborne, 2003: 507) – the issue may not be one of needing to be against ‘creativity’, ‘being the philistine’, as much as reconceptualising what we mean by the notion of ‘creativity’. Osborne argues that there is no need for the concept – as opposed to the word – for a process of inventiveness is sufficient (2003: 520). The logic for this is clear, but retaining the word will, inevitably, lead to definitions (territorializations) and attempts at explications of the process. Instead we argue that we need to reflect on the notion of creativity, and hopefully in doing so be more reflective in our thinking, or perhaps more creative in an unconscious way.

We have argued that ‘creativity’ is held up as a ‘taken-for-granted’ necessity in today’s turbulent economy. We have tried to present, or perhaps ‘re-present’, this notion of
creativity as a concept based on popular opinion. For Deleuze, opinion is a failure to think; evidence of inertia rather than creativity. That such an opinion is widespread merely reinforces the transcendence of capitalism and further limits our ability to think (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 146). We are not merely suggesting an anti-capitalist stance, although that is certainly a logical response, but a more creative form of thinking; a form of thinking that thinks beyond/outside the discourse of capitalism. Destruction of these opinions must be achieved by disrupting the supposed harmony or unity of experience (Colebrook, 2002). It is inspired by the idea of pulling down the screen of clichés that every culture produces; clichés which have become unprecedentedly trivial and egotistical in our times of hyper-capitalism (Berger, 2001). We are certainly not ‘against creativity’, but suggest that a little more sobriety is needed when calling for creativity, and a little more resistance should be offered to efforts that try to capture what it means to be creative. Nor are we saying that creativity is necessarily ‘bad’ for its destructive effects, just that we should be reflective of this impact also.

So where to go from here? One place to start, perhaps surprisingly, may be that of ‘silence’, or at least a disengagement with the current management discourse (cf. Thrift, 2000, 2002):

“Repressive forces don’t stop people expressing themselves but rather force them to express themselves. What a relief to have nothing to say, the right to say nothing, because only then is there a chance of framing the rare, and even rarer, thing that might be worth saying. What we’re plagued by these days isn’t any blocking of communication, but pointless statements” (Deleuze, 1995:129).

Following Deleuze it is worth exploring the suggestion that: “creating isn’t communicating but resisting” (Deleuze, 1995: 143). Capitalism and its ‘creative imperative’ doesn’t inhibit the development of ideas, indeed it almost forces this process, demands these very things. The problem is that these things might not be worthwhile (Deleuze, 1995:137). The communication we propose should be resisted is that of ‘common sense’ and ‘consensus in modes of thinking’– resisting creativity as currently construed. Perhaps through this resistance, through this ‘active’ thinking, through simply
‘working’ we can provoke new experiences and possibilities, and ultimately create something worthwhile.


Notes

i Deleuze would not use the term ‘ideology’, as he argued against the notion of ‘real interests’. Deleuze would argue that desire is not repressed by ‘ideology’ but that it is coded; an assemblage of socially coded affects – of singularities.

ii It is worth reminding that the subtitle of the classic *Anti-Oedipus* (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977) was *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*.

iii It is interesting to be reminded that Schumpeter’s prologue opened: “Can capitalism survive? No. I do not think it can.” Schumpeter believed that capitalism would be destroyed by its successes; that it would spawn a large intellectual class that made its living by attacking the very bourgeois system of private property and freedom so necessary for the existence of this intellectual class.
John Berger (2001: 225-227) paid Cézanne the following homage: “Everyone is agreed that Cézanne’s paintings appear to be different from those of any painter who preceded him; whilst the works of those who came after seem scarcely comparable, for they were produced out of the profound crisis which Cézanne … half foresaw and helped to provoke… Cézanne, who consciously strove towards a new synthesis between art and nature, who wanted to renew the European tradition, in fact destroyed forever the foundation of that tradition by insisting, more radically as his work developed, that visibility is as much an extension of ourselves as it is a quality-in-itself of things… Today we are so accustomed to thinking that the tradition of the old masters was challenged by increasing abstraction and finally by non-figurative art that we fail to see that Cézanne was the most fundamentally iconoclastic of all modern artists.”

Tom Kelley (2001) refers to the importance of ‘seeing well’ when he calls the third chapter of his book on IDEO *Innovation Begins with an Eye*. However, his way of ‘filling out’ the concept differs markedly from ours. For Deleuze (1997: xxxv) ‘seeing well’ means “to saturate every atom; to eliminate all waste, deadness, superfluity; everything that adheres to our lived perceptions, but also to saturate the percept, to put everything into it, to include everything...”. It would be an apt description of what Cézanne tried to do in his paintings.